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“THE PEOPLE” OF HELLER AND THEIR
POLITICS: WHETHER ILLEGAL ALIENS
SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO BEAR
ARMS AFTER UNITED STATES V.
PORTILLO-MUNOZ
Olesya A. Salnikova *
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court decided in District of Columbia v.
Heller that the Second Amendment endows individuals, regardless of
whether they are part of a militia, with the right to bear arms. 1 Although
illegal aliens are theoretically precluded from possessing firearms under
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5),2 Heller, on its face, seemed to question the validity
of this law as an outdated abridgement of an individual’s right to own a
gun. As a result, illegal aliens attempted to assert their Second Amendment
right in federal courts by challenging their convictions under § 922(g)(5) as
unlawful after Heller. 3
*
J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2013; B.A., Pepperdine University,
2008. The author thanks her family—her grandparents, parents, Katya, and Sean—for their
love and endless support during these last three years. As E.B. White once said, “The best
writing is rewriting.” The author accordingly appreciates the work and talents of the
Journal’s editorial team, particularly Nicholas G. Whitfield, Eliza Kostinskaya, Jessica
Notebaert, M ax Tanner, and M egan Lawson, for their help in editing and rewriting this
Comment to make it the best it can possibly be.
1
554 U.S. 570, 584 (2008).
2
See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) (2006), which provides, in relevant part:

It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who, being an alien . . . illegally or unlawfully in the
United States . . . to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting
commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

3
See, e.g., United States v. Portillo-M unoz, 643 F.3d 437, 439 (5th Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1969, 1969 (2012); United States v. M artinez-Guillen, No. 2:10cr192M EF, 2011 WL 588350, at *1 (M .D. Ala. Jan. 12, 2011); United States v. Adame-Najera,
No. 2:10-CR-10-01-RWS-SSC, 2010 WL 6529643, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 24, 2010); United
States v. Flores, Crim. No. 10-178 (JNE/JSM ), 2010 WL 4720223, at *1 (D. M inn. Nov. 15,
2010); United States v. Luviano-Vega, No. 5:10-CR-184-BO, 2010 WL 3732137, at *2
(E.D.N.C. Sept. 20, 2010); United States v. Yanez-Vasquez, No. 09-40056-01-SAC, 2010
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However, there is one important caveat: Heller’s somewhat amorphous
definition of “the people” of the Second Amendment. The Court defined
“the people” as “all members of the political community” who are “lawabiding, responsible citizens.” 4 The terms “political,” “law-abiding,” and
“citizens” seem to exclude deliberately those who broke the law or those
who are non-American citizens (or both, when it comes to illegal aliens,
because they illegally enter the United States). Indeed, that is exactly how
federal courts have treated “the people” since Heller, as evidenced by these
courts’ hesitation to extend the protections afforded by the Second
Amendment to illegal aliens. 5 While Heller seemed to expand the right of
individuals to bear arms, it actually constrained the Second Amendment
with respect to noncitizens.
The first federal court of appeals addressed this issue in the summer of
2011 and followed in the footsteps of the district courts. 6 In United States
v. Portillo-Munoz, a divided Fifth Circuit panel held that the Second
Amendment does not extend to aliens illegally present in the United States
and, therefore, that it does not guarantee them any individual right to
possess firearms. 7
Portillo-Munoz may have serious constitutional consequences for
illegal aliens. 8 Because the phrase “the people” is mentioned throughout
the Bill of Rights, particularly in the First, Second, Fourth, and Ninth
Amendments,9 Portillo-Munoz’s holding that illegal aliens are not included
in “the people” of the Second Amendment may signify that they are also
excluded from other Bill of Rights guarantees. This is especially true since
Heller extended its definition of “the people” to all other provisions of the
Constitution that mention this phrase. 10
This could mean that millions of United States residents are “nonpersons who have no rights to be free from unjustified searches of their
WL 411112, at *3 (D. Kan. Jan. 28, 2010); United States v. Solis-Gonzalez, No. 3:08-CR145-M R-DCK-1, 2008 WL 4539663, at *1, *3 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 26, 2008). But see United
States v. Guerrero-Leco, No. 3:08cr118, 2008 WL 4534226, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 6, 2008),
vacated, 446 F. App’x 610, 610 (4th Cir. Sept. 13, 2011) (vacating district court’s decision
to deny illegal alien Second Amendment right).
4
Heller, 554 U.S. at 580, 635, 652.
5
See, e.g., Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 439, 442; Martinez-Guillen, 2011 WL 588350,
at *3; Adame-Najera, 2010 WL 6529643, at *2; Flores, 2010 WL 4720223, at *1; LuvianoVega, 2010 WL 3732137, at *2; Yanez-Vasquez, 2010 WL 411112, at *3; Guerrero-Leco,
2008 WL 4534226, at *1; Solis-Gonzalez, 2008 WL 4539663, at *1, *3.
6
See Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 439, 442.
7
Id. at 442.
8
See id. at 442–48 (Dennis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
9
U.S. CONST. amends. I, II, IV, IX.
10
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580 (2008).
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homes and bodies and other abuses, nor to peaceably assemble or petition
the government.” 11 Whether illegal aliens belong to “the people” of the
Second Amendment is critical to determine after Portillo-Munoz not only in
the context of the right to bear arms, but also in the context of other
constitutionally protected rights.
This Comment argues that illegal aliens are not members of “the
people” of the Second Amendment and thus, they lack the constitutional
right to bear arms. In the alternative, even if illegal aliens are part of “the
people,” the government can discriminate against them—by restricting their
right to bear arms—on the ground that illegal aliens are not a suspect class
under the Equal Protection Clause.
The decision of the Portillo-Munoz court to exclude illegal aliens from
“the people” of the Second Amendment is therefore correct. Heller has
reformulated “the people” from those individuals who are part of a
“national community” to those who are part of a “political” one. 12 PortilloMunoz’s refusal to extend Heller’s definition of “the people” to other
constitutional amendments, however, is misplaced. Heller explicitly
extended its reading of “the people” to the other amendments, thereby
excluding illegal aliens from membership in “the people” across the Bill of
Rights. 13
This restriction highlights the limitation on illegal aliens’
constitutional rights even before Portillo-Munoz. The reality is that these
rights have never been automatically accorded to illegal aliens. Illegal
aliens are not part of “the people” for the purposes of the Second
Amendment specifically—and other Bill of Rights guarantees generally—
and thus, lack the constitutional right to bear arms.
Even if the phrase “the people” does not exclude illegal aliens based
on Heller’s definition, illegal aliens may nevertheless be discriminated
against since they are not a “suspect class” under the Equal Protection
Clause. 14 Because illegal aliens are not a suspect class, the right concerned
is only subject to rational basis review. 15 Under this standard, in order for
an individual to make an Equal Protection challenge, the right must either
be fundamental or the restriction on the right must impose “a lifetime
hardship.” 16
11

Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 443 (Dennis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(internal quotations omitted).
12
See Heller, 554 U.S. at 580. This Comment does not take a position on whether “the
people” should include persons that are part of a political or national community. I do not
advocate for any particular interpretation of this term.
13
Id. at 580.
14
See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216, 223 (1982).
15
See id. at 216.
16
See id. at 223.
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If the Second Amendment confers a fundamental right, it is unclear
whether illegal aliens would be included in the group of people who hold
that right. The Court has been inconsistent with which fundamental rights
apply equally to illegal aliens. It has also accorded illegal aliens less
protection under the Constitution than U.S. citizens, particularly under the
First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
If the Second Amendment does not otherwise apply to the illegal alien,
the legislative restrictions on the right then need to impose “a lifetime
hardship” on the individual. 17 Because illegal aliens who assert Second
Amendment rights are fully consenting adults who voluntarily broke the
law by illegally crossing the border of the United States, and because their
status of illegality is subject to change, the Second Amendment likely does
not pose “a lifetime hardship” on them. As a result, illegal aliens may be
excluded from the Second Amendment’s protections.
Part II provides the background for this Comment, beginning in Part
II.A with a description of the Portillo-Munoz decision. Part II.B provides
an overview of the aftermath of Portillo-Munoz. Part II.C goes back to the
initial debate surrounding the Second Amendment before Heller and how
courts interpreted “the people” of the Second Amendment. Part III explores
the Heller decision and its influence on whether illegal aliens have the right
to bear arms under the Second Amendment. This section provides support
for the argument that the Fifth Circuit’s ultimate decision in Portillo-Munoz
to exclude illegal aliens from the Second Amendment is consistent with
U.S. Supreme Court precedent. Part IV provides the Comment’s
conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND
A. UNITED STATES V. PORTILLO-MUNOZ

In July 2010, Armando Portillo-Munoz, a citizen and native of Mexico
illegally present in the United States, was arrested in the state of Texas for
possessing a .22-caliber handgun. 18 He was indicted about a month and a
half later for being an “Alien, illegally and unlawfully present in the United
States, in Possession of a Firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5).” 19 Portillo
contended that the conviction under the statute violated his Second
Amendment right to bear arms. 20
Portillo had been living in the United States since 2009, or for a year
17
18
19
20

See id.
United States v. Portillo-M unoz, 643 F.3d 437, 438–39 (5th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 439; see also 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) (2006).
Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 439.
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and a half, before he was arrested. 21 He worked for a dairy farm and then
as a ranch hand and kept a gun for protection from coyotes. 22 Prior to his
arrest, Portillo did not have any criminal history or arrests. 23 In fact,
Portillo “took on societal obligations like caring for his employer’s animals,
paying rent, and helping to financially support his girlfriend and her
daughter.” 24
Nevertheless, the district court sentenced Portillo to ten months
imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. 25 Portillo
appealed and, in the summer of 2011, the Fifth Circuit became the first
federal court of appeals to confront the issue of whether an illegal alien has
the constitutional right to bear arms under the Second Amendment. 26
In United States v. Portillo-Munoz, the majority of the Fifth Circuit
held, as a matter of first impression, that the Second Amendment did not
extend to aliens illegally present in the United States and that therefore, the
Second Amendment does not guarantee to illegal aliens the right to possess
firearms. 27 Judge Dennis dissented from the majority’s dismissal of the
Second Amendment claim, arguing instead that Portillo had an individual
right to bear arms under the Second Amendment. 28
1. The Portillo-Munoz Majority
The majority of the Portillo-Munoz court, in an opinion written by
Judge Garwood, first established that Portillo violated 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(5). 29 The court then analyzed whether Portillo’s conviction under
the statute violated the U.S. Constitution. 30 Citing the Supreme Court’s
landmark decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, the majority admitted
that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right to possess and
carry a firearm. 31 However, the court hedged this guarantee by noting that
Heller did not attempt to “clarify the entire field” of Second Amendment
jurisprudence. 32
21

Id.; see also Appellant’s Initial Brief at 6, Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437 (5th Cir.
2011) (No. 11-10086).
22
Appellant’s Initial Brief, supra note 21, at 6.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 8.
25
Id. at 6–7.
26
See Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 439.
27
Id. at 442.
28
Id. at 448 (Dennis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
29
Id. at 439 (majority opinion).
30
Id.
31
Id. (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)).
32
Id. at 440 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 635).
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The majority of the Fifth Circuit primarily focused on Heller’s
interpretation of the term “the people” in the Second Amendment. 33 It cited
Heller’s holding that the Second Amendment applies to people who are
“law-abiding, responsible citizens” who are part of a “political
community.” 34 The majority explained that such language “invalidates”
Portillo’s attempt to extend the protections of the Second Amendment to
illegal aliens because they are not “citizens” or “members of the political
community.” 35 Since aliens enter and remain in this country illegally, they
“are not Americans as that word is commonly understood.” 36
The court reasoned that the use of “the people” in both the Second and
Fourth Amendments does not mandate a holding that the two amendments
cover exactly the same groups of people. 37 It distinguished the two
amendments based on the difference between an “affirmative” right in the
Second Amendment and a “protective” right against abuses by the
government in the Fourth. 38
The majority then emphasized that the Supreme Court has long held
that Congress has the authority to make laws governing the conduct of
aliens that would be unconstitutional if applied to citizens. 39 The court
explained that since the Constitution does not prohibit Congress from
making laws that distinguish between citizens and aliens or between lawful
and illegal aliens, the same analysis should apply in the interpretation of the
Second Amendment text. 40
The majority concluded that the phrase “the people” in the Second
Amendment does not include aliens illegally in the United States, such as
Portillo, and that § 922(g)(5) is constitutional under the Second
Amendment. 41
The court hedged its decision by excluding “the
constitutional trial, personal bodily integrity, privacy or speech rights of
illegal aliens.” 42
33

See id.
Id. (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 580, 635).
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 441.
39
Id. (citing M athews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 84, 87 (1976) (holding as constitutional
under the Due Process Clause a federal law limiting eligibility for M edicare Part B to aliens
admitted for permanent residence and residing in the U.S. for at least five years)).
40
Id. at 442.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 442 n.3 (“[W]e speak only to whether the Second Amendment precludes
Congress from limiting the actual, affirmative conduct of aliens while they are illegally
present in this country. This is a pure question of law which the district court has correctly
answered.”).
34
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2. The Portillo-Munoz Dissent
Judge Dennis dissented from the decision of the majority to dismiss
Portillo’s Second Amendment claim. 43
First, he reasoned that Supreme Court precedent recognizes that the
phrase “the people” has the same meaning in the First, Second, and Fourth
Amendments. 44 Dennis disagreed with the majority’s distinction between
the Second Amendment as an “affirmative” right and the Fourth
Amendment as a “protective” right. 45 He explained that both of these
amendments refer to a “right of the people” to be free from “unwarranted
government intrusion.” 46
Second, Dennis disagreed with the majority’s “categorical” conclusion
that persons like Portillo are not part of “the people” because, he argued,
this interpretation is contrary to the Supreme Court’s holding in Plyler v.
Doe. 47 The Court in Plyler recognized that illegal aliens are “person[s]” in
the constitutional sense. 48 Because people is merely the plural of person,
the judge concluded that this reasoning applied to the Second Amendment
as well. 49
Third, Dennis noted that the rationale of the majority is contrary to
Supreme Court precedent in Heller and Verdugo-Urquidez. 50 In both of
these cases, the Supreme Court indicated that “the people” includes those
who have developed “sufficient connection” with the United States. 51
Citing Verdugo-Urquidez, the judge maintained that an alien establishes
“sufficient” connections with this country when he or she (1) is
“voluntarily” present in the United States, and (2) “accept[s] some societal
obligations.” 52
43

Id. at 442 (Dennis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 443.
45
Id. at 444.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 445.
48
Id. (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982) (holding that although
undocumented resident aliens cannot be treated as a “suspect class,” and although education
is not a “fundamental right,” a Texas statute depriving a “discrete class of children” from
their right to public education imposes a “lifetime hardship” on them)).
49
Id.
50
Id. at 446.
51
Id. (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580 (2008); United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990)). In Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court held that
while the Fourth Amendment did not apply to the search by American authorities of the
M exican residence of a M exican citizen and resident with no voluntary attachment to the
United States, it may apply to illegal aliens who are “voluntarily” present in the United
States and who have accepted “some societal obligations.” 494 U.S. at 273, 275.
52
Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 446 (Dennis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
44

632

OLESYA A. SALNIKOVA

[Vol. 103

Dennis concluded that Portillo had sufficient connections with this
country. 53 Unlike the alien in Verdugo-Urquidez, Portillo came to the
United States of his own volition. 54 Also unlike the alien in VerdugoUrquidez, Portillo accepted several societal obligations and did not have
any criminal record or history of arrests. 55 Even though Verdugo-Urquidez
did not extend Fourth Amendment protection to an alien who did not have
substantial connections with the United States, Dennis reasoned that the
Court still assumed “for the sake of argument” that aliens could be
protected by the Fourth Amendment, which makes it possible that an illegal
alien with sufficient connections may seek such protection in the future. 56
Judge Dennis therefore disagreed with the majority on the question of
whether aliens such as Portillo are part of “the people,” and have any rights
under the First, Second, and Fourth Amendments. 57 In his view, all these
Amendments refer to the same people. Since Portillo had substantial
connections with this country and because “the majority’s holding
effectively nullifies the rights of countless others like him,” the judge
dissented. 58
B. THE HAZY AFTERMATH OF PORTILLO-MUNOZ

Four federal courts have already accepted the reasoning of the PortilloMunoz majority opinion by explicitly citing the decision that illegal aliens
do not have the right to bear arms under the Second Amendment.
In United States v. Flores-Higuera, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)’s prohibition
on illegal aliens possessing firearms does not violate the Second
Amendment. 59 The court reasoned that while Heller gave individuals the
right to possess a gun in self-defense, this right “is not unlimited.” 60 It
referred to courts like Portillo-Munoz that have held § 922 to be “‘a
presumptively lawful long-standing prohibition’ on the possession of
firearms.” 61 Citing Portillo-Munoz, among other federal court decisions,
53

Id. at 447.
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id. (citing Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 272–73 (declining to decide the issue
because “such a claim [was not] squarely before [the Court],” but “assuming such [illegal]
aliens would be entitled to Fourth Amendment protections,” they would have to be “in the
United States voluntarily and presumably [] accepted some societal obligations”)).
57
Id. at 448.
58
Id.
59
No. 1:11-CR-182-TCB-CCH, 2011 WL 3329286, at *3 (N.D. Ga. July 6, 2011).
60
Id. at *2 (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008)).
61
Id. (citing United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199, 1205–06 (11th Cir. 2010)).
54
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the Flores-Higuera court held not only that § 922 “disqualified” illegal
aliens from Second Amendment rights, but also that illegal aliens never had
these rights in the first place because they are not among “the people”
contemplated by the Second Amendment. 62
Similarly, in United States v. Mirza, the Fifth Circuit affirmed PortilloMunoz by rejecting the defendant’s Second Amendment challenge to his
convictions under § 922(g)(5). 63 In this case, a citizen of Pakistan was
convicted of “various counts of possessing weapons and ammunition while
being unlawfully in the United States.” 64 The court cited its reasoning in
Portillo-Munoz and held that the phrase “the people” in the Second
Amendment does not include aliens illegally present in the United States. 65
It concluded that since the rights “conferred by the Second Amendment do
not extend to individuals like Mirza who are unlawfully present in the
United States,” he was foreclosed from arguing that his weapons and
ammunition convictions violate his Second Amendment rights. 66
The Eighth Circuit affirmed Portillo-Munoz in United States v.
Flores. 67 In Flores, the defendant “was indicted on a charge of being an
illegal alien in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(5)(A) and 924(a)(2).” 68 The defendant “moved to dismiss the
indictment, arguing that § 922(g)(5)(A) was facially unconstitutional in
light of [Heller].” 69 The defendant appealed after the district court denied
the motion. 70 In a brief per curiam decision, the Eighth Circuit agreed with
the Fifth Circuit “that the protections of the Second Amendment do not
extend to aliens illegally present in this country,” as per Portillo-Munoz. 71
Most recently, the Fourth Circuit has held that the Second Amendment
right to bear arms does not extend to illegal aliens in United States v.
Carpio-Leon. 72 The defendant, a citizen of Mexico who was “indicted for
possessing firearms while being illegally or unlawfully in the United States
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5),” contended that “§ 922(g)(5) violated
his rights under the Second and Fifth Amendments.” 73 Citing Heller, the
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Id.
United States v. M irza, No. 10-20725, 454 F. App’x 249, 258 (5th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 251.
Id. at 257.
Id.
663 F.3d 1022, 1022–23 (8th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
Id.
Id. at 1023.
Id.
Id.
701 F.3d 974, 982 (4th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 975 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) (2006)).
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Carpio-Leon court concluded “that illegal aliens do not belong to the class
of law-abiding members of the political community to whom the protection
of the Second Amendment is given.” 74
Significantly, the court referenced Portillo-Munoz and limited its
decision to illegal aliens. 75 It reasoned that defining aliens as “illegal”
“emanates from the power to expel or exclude aliens [which is] a
fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political
departments [that is] largely immune from judicial control.” 76 Therefore,
“when Congress regulates illegal aliens by prohibiting them from
possessing firearms, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5), it is functioning in a special
area of law committed largely to the political branches.” 77
Despite these decisions, Portillo-Munoz has not been accepted in every
context. The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded the judgment of the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of North Carolina in United States v.
Guerrero-Leco.78 In Guerrero-Leco, the defendant was an alien illegally in
the United States who pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5). 79 Guerrero-Leco’s argument was premised on
Heller’s holding conferring a right to bear arms to individuals. 80
The Fourth Circuit noted that it formulated in United States v. Chester
a two-prong analysis “to determine whether a statute or regulation violates a
defendant’s Second Amendment right to bear firearms.” 81 In vacating and
remanding the district court’s decision, the Guerrero-Leco court cited its
own holding from Chester:
The first question is “whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling
within the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee.” This historical inquiry
seeks to determine whether the conduct at issue was understood to be within the scope
of the right at the time of ratification. If it was not, then the challenged law is valid.
If the challenged regulation burdens conduct that was within the scope of the Second
Amendment as historically understood, then we move to the second step of applying
82
an appropriate form of means-end scrutiny.

Portillo-Munoz has also not been extended to legal, permanent aliens,
even though these individuals are technically not citizens of the United

74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82

Id. at 981.
Id.
Id. (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 982.
446 F. App’x 610, 610 (4th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2010)).
Id. (quoting Chester, 628 F.3d at 680 (citations omitted)).
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States. 83 The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts in
Fletcher v. Haas concluded that lawful, permanent resident aliens are
among “the people” for whom the Second Amendment provides a right to
bear arms. 84 The court, citing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, reasoned
that lawful, permanent resident aliens have “necessarily ‘developed
sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of [the]
community’” because they have accepted societal obligations. 85 They
resided and worked lawfully in the United States, and one alien was even
married to a U.S. citizen. 86 The citizenship requirement of Massachusetts
firearm regulations accordingly violated the Second Amendment as it
applied to legal alien defendants. 87
The Fletcher court distinguished Portillo-Munoz by noting that “[in]
cases where state laws restricting the rights of aliens have been struck
down, the Supreme Court has emphasized ‘the rights thus protected were
those of aliens who were lawfully inhabitants of the states in question.’” 88
The court emphasized that federal decisions like Portillo-Munoz do not
apply in this context because they are only limited to illegal aliens. 89
83

See Fletcher v. Haas, 851 F. Supp. 2d 287, 288 (D. M ass. 2012). But see United States
v. Alkhaldi, No. 4:12CR00001-01 JLH, 2012 WL 5415787, at *4 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 17, 2012),
adopted by No. 4:12CR00001-01 JLH, 2012 WL 5415579, at *5 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 6, 2012).
Alkhaldi was an alien present in the United States on a student visa, i.e., a “nonimmigrant ‘F Visa.’” Alkhaldi, 2012 WL 5415787, at *1. The court, citing VerdugoUrquidez and Fletcher, found that Alkhaldi was “not in the class of persons who are part of
the national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this
country to be considered part of that community for purposes of the Second Amendment.”
Id. at *4. The court reasoned that the defendant “did not come to the United States with the
intention of gaining citizenship and, thus, is not firmly on the path toward that goal”; there
was no evidence of him intending to “abandon his foreign resident [sic]”; and he was merely
temporarily in this country “to pursue educational opportunities.” Id. Because Alkhaldi was
not part of “the people” of the Second Amendment, the court denied his 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(5) challenge. Id. The Alkhaldi court noted that the district court in Fletcher
specifically hedged that it was not deciding whether the Second Amendment was enjoyed by
“all lawfully admitted aliens.” Id. at *2 (quoting Fletcher, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 301).
84
Fletcher, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 288.
85
Id. at 301 (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990)).
86
Id. at 301.
87
See id. at 302–03.
88
Id. at 299 (quoting United States v. Portillo-M unoz, 643 F.3d 437, 441 (5th Cir.
2011)). The Fletcher court also mentioned two cases that distinguished between legal and
illegal aliens in constitutional rights: Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953)
(holding that an alien is entitled to Fifth Amendment protection to the extent that he “is a
lawful permanent resident of the United States and remains physically present there”), and
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39 (1915) (holding that “the complainant is entitled under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the equal protection of its laws” because he is “lawfully an
inhabitant of Arizona”). Fletcher, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 299.
89
Fletcher, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 300.
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There has also been some criticism of Portillo-Munoz by legal
scholars. Critics have questioned the majority’s distinction between an
“affirmative” right in the Second Amendment and a “protective” right in the
Fourth Amendment, labeling it as “unpersuasive.” 90 Such a distinction,
they argue, contradicts Heller itself, where the Supreme Court explicitly
said, “‘[I]t has always been widely understood that the Second Amendment,
like the First and Fourth Amendments, codified a pre-existing right.’” 91 As
a result, “[b]oth the Second and Fourth Amendments plainly refer to the
right of ‘the people’ to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion.” 92
If this reasoning is applied, then either “[i]t may be that illegal aliens should
get no protection from the Bill of Rights or less than what those who are
lawfully here get.” 93
Some critics have even characterized such a distinction as
“troubling.” 94 Adam Winkler, a professor at UCLA School of Law,
explained that the “implications of the court’s reasoning are troubling”
because “‘the people’ recognized by the Second Amendment are the same
‘people’ recognized in the First and Fourth Amendments.” 95 Professor
Winkler further posed: “If undocumented aliens aren’t part of ‘the people’
for Second Amendment purposes, then can the police invade their homes
without probable cause? Can the government stop them from peaceably
assembling? If accepted, this logic could expand government authority and
make illegal aliens further strangers to American law.” 96 Professor
Winkler’s concerns highlight the serious impact that the Fifth Circuit’s
parsing of “the people” could have not only on the Second Amendment, but
also on other Bill of Rights guarantees.
Critics have additionally questioned Portillo-Munoz’s ultimate
90
Eugene Volokh, The Constitutional Rights of Illegal Aliens, Under the First, Second,
and Fourth Amendments, VOLOKH CONSP IRACY (June 13, 2011, 6:01 PM ),
http://www.volokh.com/2011/06/13/the-constitutional-rights-of-illegal-aliens-under-thefirst-second-and-fourth-amendments/ (quoting Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 444 (Dennis, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)); see also Gerard N. M agliocca, The Bill of Rights
and Illegal Immigrants, BALKINIZATION (June 16, 2011, 9:04 AM ), http://balkin.blogspot.
com/2011/06/bill-of-rights-and-illegal-immigrants.html.
91
Volokh, supra note 90 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592
(2008)).
92
Id.
93
M agliocca, supra note 90 (“I am unpersuaded by the Fifth Circuit’s argument that
‘people’ can mean different things in different parts of the Constitution. . . . I don’t see any
support for the proposition that illegal aliens would, for example, get Fourth Amendment
rights but no First or Second Amendment rights.”).
94
Alisa A. Johnson & Thomas D. Edmondson, Fifth Circuit Declares that Illegal Aliens
Lack Second Amendment Right to Bear Arms, 80 U.S. L.WK . 8 (2011).
95
Id.
96
Id.
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conclusion that illegal aliens are not part of “the people” of the Second
Amendment because the sole basis for this conclusion is that Portillo was
unlawfully present in the United States. 97 Critics argue that such a rationale
is “wholly unsupported by the applicable precedents.” 98 In both Heller and
Verdugo-Urquidez, they contend, “[T]he Supreme Court indicated that ‘the
people’ includes people who have developed ‘sufficient connection’ with
the United States . . . . Nothing in Verdugo-Urquidez requires that the alien
must be lawfully present in the United States in order to establish
substantial connections . . . .” 99
The aftermath of Portillo-Munoz has been nothing short of
confounding, with some courts and thinkers accepting the decision without
question as an accurate application of Heller, and others limiting its reach
or entirely questioning its reasoning and/or ultimate conclusion. As a
result, to make sense of Portillo-Munoz, it is first necessary to go back to
the time before Heller to see how courts have interpreted “the people” of
the Second Amendment.
C. THE SECOND AMENDMENT BEFORE HELLER: COURTS’
INTERPRETATIONS OF “THE PEOPLE”

“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.” 100
Even before the Supreme Court’s much-anticipated decision in District
of Columbia v. Heller, the Second Amendment, consisting of only one
seemingly simple sentence, has puzzled and aggravated scholars to the
point of division, hurling America into a highly charged debate about how
the Second Amendment should be interpreted.
Two models of
interpretation emerged: the “individual right model” and the “collective
right model.” 101 Those adhering to the individual right model argue that
“the Second Amendment protects a right of individuals to possess arms for
private use,” while advocates of the collective right model insist that the
“Amendment protects only a right of the various state governments to
preserve and arm their militias.” 102
97

Volokh, supra note 90.
Id. (quoting United States v. Portillo-M unoz, 643 F.3d 437, 445 (5th Cir. 2011)
(Dennis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
99
Id. (quoting Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 445–46 (Dennis, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)).
100
U.S. CONST. amend. II.
101
Kevin Jones, Note, Reframing the Second Amendment Debate: Drawing Cultural
Theory from the Holster, 77 UM KC L. REV. 487, 490 (2008).
102
Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 379 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
98
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Until 2001, every federal circuit court of appeals that ruled on the issue
had adopted the collective right approach. 103 The Fifth Circuit was the first
to adopt the individual right model in United States v. Emerson. 104 The
Ninth Circuit subsequently reaffirmed the collective right approach in
Silveira v. Lockyer. 105 This divisiveness culminated in the decision of the
D.C. Circuit in Parker v. District of Columbia, which articulated an
individual right to bear arms approach contrary to that of Silveira. 106
Not surprisingly, both models of interpretation differ in their
conception of the Second Amendment text—and, specifically, in their
interpretation of who should be included in the phrase “the people.” In
order to understand fully what this phrase means, this Comment examines
both models and their interpretations of “the people.”
1. Individual Right Approach
Under the individual right model, the Second Amendment “protects
the right of the individual, including those not then actually a member of
any militia or engaged in active military service or training, to privately
possess and bear their own firearms.” 107 Individualists minimize the weight
of the preamble. 108 They maintain that the Second Amendment’s placement
in the Bill of Rights reinforces its emphasis on individual rights—the first
103

See id. at 380; Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1063 (9th Cir. 2002).
270 F.3d 203, 260 (5th Cir. 2001). In Emerson, the defendant was indicted for
possessing a firearm while he was subject to a court order prohibiting the use, attempted use,
or threatened use of physical force. Id. at 211–12. The defendant moved to dismiss the
indictment by arguing that it violated his Second Amendment right. Id. at 212. The Fifth
Circuit held that the Second Amendment protects the right of individuals to privately keep
and bear their own firearms “that are suitable as individual, personal weapons . . . regardless
of whether the particular individual is then actually a member of a militia.” Id. at 264.
However, the court denied the defendant the right to the Second Amendment because he
posed a credible threat to the physical safety of his wife and child. Id. at 260–65.
105
312 F.3d at 1087. In Silveira, plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of
amendments to the California Assault Weapons Control Act (AWCA), which strengthened
restrictions on possession, use, and transfer of assault weapons. George A. M ocsary, Note,
Explaining Away the Obvious: The Infeasibility of Characterizing the Second Amendment as
a Nonindividual Right, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2113, 2147 (2008). The Ninth Circuit held that
the Second Amendment grants a collective, as opposed to an individual, right to bear arms.
Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1092–93.
106
Parker, 478 F.3d at 395. In Parker, private citizens not associated with a militia
brought a Second Amendment challenge against two District of Columbia statutes, including
prohibitions against registration of handguns and the carrying of firearms without a license.
Id. at 373. Following Emerson’s analysis, the Parker court similarly held that the Second
Amendment granted an individual right to bear arms, subject to reasonable restrictions. Id.
at 381–401; see also M ocsary, supra note 105, at 2134–35.
107
Emerson, 270 F.3d at 260.
108
Jones, supra note 101, at 493.
104
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eight amendments are generally seen as protections of “rights enjoyed by
citizens in their individual capacity.” 109 As a result, the right to bear arms is
seen as a “personal” rather than a “collective” right. 110 The Emerson court
even went as far as to profess that “the people,” as used in the Constitution,
including the Second Amendment, “refers to individual Americans.” 111
Individualists do not require “any special or unique meaning” to be
attributed to the word “people” in the Second Amendment. 112 This
interpretation gives the same meaning to the words “the people” as in the
First and Fourth Amendments, as well as in the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments. 113 Both the Parker and the Emerson courts declined to
interpret “the people” of the Second Amendment to mean a “subset” of
individuals, such as “the organized militia,” because of the uniform
construction of other Bill of Rights provisions. 114
2. Collective Right Approach
Under the collective right model, the Second Amendment right to bear
arms guarantees the right of the people “to maintain effective state militias,
but does not provide any type of individual right to own or possess
weapons.” 115
According to this interpretation, “federal and state
governments have the full authority to enact prohibitions and restrictions on
the use and possession of firearms, subject only to generally applicable
constitutional constraints.” 116
Collectivists focus on the prefatory language “‘[a] well regulated
Militia’ so as to limit the application of the operative clause ‘the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms’ to the right of the state to arm its militia.” 117
Those who subscribe to the collective right theory thus interpret “the
people” as some subset of individuals, such as “the organized militia,” “the
people who are engaged in militia service,” or maybe not any individuals at

109

Parker, 478 F.3d at 383; see also Jones, supra note 101, at 493.
Emerson, 270 F.3d at 228–29 (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); M oore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494
(1977)).
111
Id. at 229 (emphasis added).
112
Id. at 227. In other words, individualists do not interpret “the people” in the Second
Amendment to mean some subset of individuals such as “the organized militia.” Id.; Parker,
478 F.3d at 381.
113
Parker, 478 F.3d at 381; Emerson, 270 F.3d at 227.
114
Parker, 478 F.3d at 381–82; see also Emerson, 270 F.3d at 227–28.
115
Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2002).
116
Id.
117
Jones, supra note 101, at 490.
110
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all, but rather as “the states.” 118
Pre-Heller law demonstrates the conflict between these two Second
Amendment theories. While individualists interpreted the Amendment as
an individual right because of the use of the term “people” and its
placement within the Bill of Rights, collectivists saw the Second
Amendment right as “collective” in nature and one that restricts the right to
bear arms to the people of the states or the states themselves. Heller
resolved this debate by siding with the individualists in deciding that the
Second Amendment right to bear arms belongs to “the people” as
individuals. 119
III. DISCUSSION
This Comment argues that illegal aliens do not have the right to bear
arms because they are not members of “the people” of the Second
Amendment. Even if illegal aliens are part of this group, they can be
discriminated against since they are not a suspect class under the Equal
Protection Clause.
The decision of the Portillo-Munoz court to exclude illegal aliens from
“the people” of the Second Amendment is correct largely due to Heller’s
interpretation of the phrase as persons part of a “political” community
rather than a “national” one. Portillo-Munoz was incorrect in assuming that
“the people” has a different meaning from amendment to amendment,
however. Heller extended its interpretation of “the people” to other
constitutional amendments, which serves to exclude illegal aliens from
membership in this group.
Even if illegal aliens are not excluded from “the people,” they are not a
suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause. Therefore, restrictions on
their rights are accorded only rational basis review, which requires either
that the right be fundamental or that the restriction on the right impose “a
lifetime hardship.” Although the right to bear arms is fundamental, that
categorization is of little consequence because constitutional rights are not
accorded automatically to illegal aliens. Restrictions on the right to bear
arms also do not pose “a lifetime hardship” on illegal aliens. As a result,
illegal aliens have no equal protection claim to the Second Amendment and
therefore, they may be excluded from enjoying the protections that it
affords.

118
119

Parker, 478 F.3d at 381; Emerson, 270 F.3d at 227.
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 584–85 (2008).
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A. HELLER RESTRICTED “THE PEOPLE” TO “LAW-ABIDING” CITIZENS
WHO ARE MEMBERS OF A “POLITICAL COMMUNITY”

The Supreme Court finally decided who belongs in “the people” of the
Second Amendment in District of Columbia v. Heller. 120 In Heller, Dick
Anthony Heller challenged the District of Columbia’s gun-ban statutes. 121
Heller was a D.C. special police officer who was authorized to carry a
handgun while on duty. 122 He applied for a registration certificate for a
handgun he wished to keep at home, but the District refused. 123 The law
prohibited handguns and required that lawfully possessed firearms be kept
unloaded and disassembled. 124 Justice Scalia ruled, on behalf of a 5–4
majority, that the right to bear arms is protected by the Second Amendment
and belongs to “the people” as individuals regardless of whether they act as
part of a militia or in a military capacity. 125
Most relevant to this analysis, the majority of the Court held that “the
people” includes persons who are part of a “political community” and who
are “law-abiding” citizens. 126 The Court noted that the right to bear arms
belongs to “all members of the political community.” 127 It limited the
“right of the people” by holding that the Second Amendment “elevates
above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use
arms in defense of hearth and home.” 128
Moreover, Heller extended its definition of “the people” to other Bill
of Rights provisions that use this phrase. It acknowledged that the Bill of
Rights uses “right of the people” two other times: in the First Amendment’s
Assembly-and-Petition Clause 129 and in the Fourth Amendment’s Searchand-Seizure Clause. 130 Additionally, the Ninth Amendment 131 “uses very
120

See id. at 581. It has been nearly seventy years since the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
on the Second Amendment in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
121
Heller, 554 U.S. at 575–76. Heller originally challenged the constitutionality of
D.C.’s gun-ban statutes in Parker, 478 F.3d at 379.
122
Heller, 554 U.S. at 575.
123
Id.
124
Id. at 570.
125
Id. at 584.
126
Id. at 579–81, 635.
127
Id. at 579–81.
128
Id. at 580, 635.
129
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
130
Heller, 554 U.S. at 580, 635. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
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similar terminology.” 132 The Court explained that these all refer to the
“political community”: “[I]n all six other provisions of the Constitution that
mention ‘the people,’ the term unambiguously refers to all members of the
political community.” 133
The Court also cautioned that, like other constitutional rights, the
Second Amendment right to bear arms is not absolute. 134 It pointed to a
number of presumptively constitutional restrictions on firearm possession:
Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope
of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill,
or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and
government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the
135
commercial sale of arms.

Even though the Court did not mention the possession of firearms by
aliens—illegal or otherwise—in its list of restrictions, it maintained that the
list “does not purport to be exhaustive.” 136
Heller held that the Second Amendment confers an individual right to
bear arms, but it constrained this right to people who are “members of the
political community” and “law-abiding, responsible citizens.” 137 The Court
also restricted the Second Amendment by reinforcing a nonexclusive list of
pre-Heller restrictions on who may own and carry firearms. 138 This limits
the Second Amendment right to bear arms to American citizens, thereby
theoretically excluding noncitizens.
B. HELLER’S INTERPRETATION OF “THE PEOPLE” HAS ALTERED THE
LANDSCAPE OF SECOND AMENDMENT LAW FOR ILLEGAL ALIENS.

1. Heller Paved the Way for McDonald v. City of Chicago
The Supreme Court returned to the Second Amendment in McDonald

probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
131
“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. IX (emphasis added).
132
Heller, 554 U.S. at 579–81.
133
Id. at 580 (emphasis added).
134
Id. at 626.
135
Id. at 626–27.
136
Id. at 627 n.26.
137
Id. at 580, 635.
138
Id. at 626–27.
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v. City of Chicago. 139 In this case, petitioners alleged that Chicago’s
handgun ban left them vulnerable to criminals. 140 They sought a
declaration that the ban and several related city ordinances violated the
Second and Fourteenth Amendments. 141
The Court, in a plurality decision, ruled that the Second Amendment
right to keep and bear arms is incorporated into the concept of due
process. 142 It reiterated Heller’s premise that individual self-defense is “the
central component” of the Second Amendment. 143 “Self-defense is a basic
right,” the Court reasoned, which is “fundamental to our scheme of ordered
liberty” because it is “‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition.’” 144
As a result, McDonald extended Heller’s interpretation of the Second
Amendment to the states. 145 It also expanded Heller in holding that the
Second Amendment is a fundamental right. This potentially broadens
Heller’s interpretation of “the people” to include not only persons within
the “political community” but also “persons” in the broader, due process
sense, which includes both citizens and noncitizens alike. 146
2. Heller Influenced Lower Federal Courts to Deny Illegal
Aliens’ Claims Under the Second Amendment
Whether or not McDonald will make a difference in the analysis of
alien gun rights, Heller’s reformulation of “the people” has already had a
significant impact on federal courts confronted with this issue. Heller’s
holding that the right to bear arms is an individual—and not merely a
collective—right has enabled aliens to bring claims in court by arguing that
they are entitled to the constitutional right to bear arms under the Second
Amendment. 147
Federal district courts that have confronted this issue have upheld laws
banning or restricting the possession of firearms by illegal aliens based on
Scalia’s reasoning in Heller. 148 These courts have held that defendant
139

130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
Id. at 3021.
141
Id.
142
Id. at 3042.
143
Id. at 3036 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 599).
144
Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721
(1997)).
145
Pratheepan Gulasekaram, “The People” of the Second Amendment: Citizenship and
the Right to Bear Arms, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1521, 1539 (2010).
146
See infra Part III.C for a discussion on “persons” of the Fourteenth Amendment.
147
See, e.g., United States v. Portillo-M unoz, 643 F.3d 437, 439 (5th Cir. 2011).
148
See, e.g., United States v. M artinez-Guillen, No. 2:10cr192-M EF, 2011 WL 588350,
140
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aliens are not able to show that they have any Second Amendment rights
because they are not among “the people” contemplated by the Second
Amendment. 149 The reason for this exclusion is that illegal aliens are not
“law-abiding, responsible citizens,” as the phrase is interpreted in Heller. 150
As a result, federal district courts have concluded that the Second
Amendment right to bear arms “was intended . . . and was guaranteed . . . to
be exercised and enjoyed by the citizen.” 151
These courts have also reasoned that Heller limited the Second
Amendment by foreclosing it to those who were already subject to “longstanding prohibitions” 152 on the possession of firearms. 153 Although Heller
did not mention aliens specifically in its list of prohibitions, federal district
courts have interpreted this section of Heller broadly by holding that
§ 922(g)(5), the illegal alien category of the federal statute, is included in
what the courts interpreted as the Supreme Court’s nonexclusive list. 154
It is evident from the multiplicity of lower federal court decisions that
Heller influenced aliens to assert their individual Second Amendment right
to bear arms or, at a bare minimum, popularized a new legal argument for
aliens seeking to assert their Second Amendment rights. On the other hand,
Heller has also influenced lower federal courts to deny such claims not only
based on its definition of “the people” as “law-abiding . . . citizens,” but
also because it affirmed long-standing firearm prohibitions under 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g). Lower federal courts have interpreted Heller’s list of prohibitions
as nonexclusive, thereby preventing defendant aliens from asserting that
their Second Amendment rights are violated by § 922(g)(5).

at *3 (M .D. Ala. Jan. 12, 2011); United States v. Adame-Najera, No. 2:10-CR-10-01-RWSSSC, 2010 WL 6529643, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 24, 2010); United States v. Flores, Crim. No.
10-178 (JNE/JSM ), 2010 WL 4720223, at *1 (D. M inn. Nov. 15, 2010); United States v.
Luviano-Vega, No. 5:10-CR-184-BO, 2010 WL 3732137, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 20, 2010);
United States v. Yanez-Vasquez, No. 09-40056-01-SAC, 2010 WL 411112, at *3 (D. Kan.
Jan. 28, 2010); United States v. Guerrero-Leco, No. 3:08cr118, 2008 WL 4534226, at *1
(W.D.N.C. Oct. 6, 2008); United States v. Solis-Gonzalez, No. 3:08-CR-145-M R-DCK-1,
2008 WL 4539663, at *1, *3 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 26, 2008).
149
Yanez-Vasquez, 2010 WL 411112, at *2.
150
Id.; Adame-Najera, 2010 WL 6529643, at *3.
151
Yanez-Vasquez, 2010 WL 411112, at *2.
152
See supra Part III.A for a discussion of the Supreme Court’s long-standing
prohibitions.
153
Yanez-Vasquez, 2010 WL 411112, at *2; see also Heller v. District of Columbia, 554
U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008); Guerrero-Leco, 2008 WL 4534226, at *1; Solis-Gonzalez, 2008
WL 4539663, at *3 (“[D]ecisions by this Court as well as other district courts across the
country consistently hold that Heller does not undermine the constitutionality of prohibitions
under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).”).
154
Yanez-Vasquez, 2010 WL 411112, at *4.
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C. ILLEGAL ALIENS ARE ACCORDED INCONSISTENT PROTECTION
UNDER THE U.S. CONSTITUTION

The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that noncitizens, whether
legal or illegal, are entitled to some rights under the U.S. Constitution. The
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment
have historically protected aliens as “persons” under the Constitution. 155
Because aliens are “persons” within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment, they are also accorded rights under the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments. 156 Additionally, there is a possibility that the Fourth
Amendment may be able to protect those illegal aliens who are part of a
“national community” or who “have developed sufficient connection with
this country.” 157 Finally, the Supreme Court has previously recognized that
aliens have certain rights under the First Amendment. 158
1. “Persons” of the Fourteenth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments
As early as the 1890s, the U.S. Supreme Court, in United States v.
Wong Wing, recognized that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the Fifth and Sixth Amendments,
apply to noncitizens living in the United States.
Chinese persons who were illegally present in the United States were
unlawfully detained in Wong Wing. 159 The Court held that the Fourteenth
Amendment is not “confined to the protection of citizens.” 160 The
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court explained, are
“universal in their application to all persons within the territorial
jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or [of]
nationality.” 161 Moreover, the equal protection of the laws “is a pledge of
the protection of equal laws.” 162 The Wong Wing Court thereby accorded
both Due Process and Equal Protection rights to aliens living in the U.S.
The Court then applied this reasoning to the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments. It explained that “all persons within the territory of the
United States are entitled to the protection guaranteed by those

155

See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 202 (1982); United States v. Wong Wing, 163 U.S.
228, 242–43 (1896).
156
See Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 242–43.
157
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264–66 (1990).
158
See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252,
282 (1941).
159
163 U.S. at 229.
160
Id. at 238 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)).
161
Id.
162
Id. (emphasis added).
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amendments.” 163 Because these provisions refer to “persons,” the Court
extended their protection to any person living in the United States and not
just to American citizens. 164 It further noted, “[E]ven aliens shall not be
held to answer for a capital or other infamous crime . . . nor be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” 165 The Wong Wing
Court thus set a precedent for the protection of illegal aliens under the
Fourteenth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments.
In the 1982 decision of Plyler v. Doe, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
that noncitizens are entitled to Due Process and Equal Protection rights
because they are “persons” under the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments. 166
In Plyler, Mexican children who had entered the United States illegally and
resided in Texas sought injunctive and declaratory relief against exclusion
from public schools pursuant to a Texas statute. 167 The Court held that the
Equal Protection Clause applied because the undocumented status of the
children did not establish a sufficient rational basis for denying the benefits
that the state afforded other residents. 168
The Plyler Court, similar to Heller and pre-Heller decisions, analyzed
the meaning of the constitutional term “persons.” 169 As the Wong Wing
Court did long ago, the Plyler Court held that undocumented aliens,
regardless of their immigration status, are persons in the constitutional
sense: “[W]hatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien is surely
a ‘person’ in any ordinary sense of that term.” 170 The Court explained that
the Fourteenth Amendment 171 extends to “[e]very citizen or subject of
another country” within U.S. jurisdiction. 172 Similar to Wong Wing, Plyler
concluded that the Equal Protection Clause covers the same class of persons
as the Due Process Clause. 173 The decision affirmed that aliens, even
unlawful aliens, have long been recognized as “persons” guaranteed due
process of the law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as
the Sixth Amendment. 174 The Court additionally affirmed its holding that
163

Id.
See id.
165
Id.
166
See 457 U.S. 220, 230 (1982).
167
Id. at 205–08.
168
Id. at 202.
169
See id. at 210–13.
170
Id. at 210.
171
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States.” U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
172
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 211 n.10.
173
See id. at 211.
174
See id. at 210; see also Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953)
164
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“the Fifth Amendment protects aliens whose presence in this country is
unlawful from invidious discrimination by the Federal Government.” 175
However, the Court in Plyler limited aliens’ access to Fourteenth
Amendment rights by utilizing only rational basis review. 176 This means
that for an illegal alien to benefit from the equal protection of the laws,
either the right concerned has to be fundamental or the regulation of the
right must impose “a lifetime hardship” on the class of illegal aliens. 177
The Court did not consider education a fundamental right because
public education is not a right granted to individuals by the Constitution. 178
The statute, however, still imposed “a lifetime hardship on a discrete class
of children not accountable for their disabling status.” 179 The basis for this
decision was that the alien children were involuntarily in the U.S. because
their parents brought them into the country. 180 The deprivation of education
also has a lifelong social, economic, intellectual, and psychological effect
on the well-being of the individual, thereby posing “an obstacle to
individual achievement.” 181
The Supreme Court decisions discussed illustrate that aliens, illegal or
not, are entitled to the due process and equal protection rights explicitly
provided for in the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as those in the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments.
These privileges, however, are not absolute.
Restrictions on illegal aliens made on the basis of their alien status are
subject only to rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause.
This requires that the right concerned be either fundamental or that the
government’s restrictions on the right impose “a lifetime hardship” on the
(holding that a resident alien is a “person” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment);
United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 693 (1898) (holding that all persons within
the territory of the United States, including aliens unlawfully present, may invoke the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments to challenge actions of the federal government); United States v.
Wong Wing, 163 U.S. 228, 242–43 (1896) (holding that resident aliens are entitled to Fifth
and Sixth Amendment rights).
175
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 210 (citing M athews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976)).
176
See id. at 202 (“[T]he discrimination in [the Texas statute] can hardly be considered
rational unless it futhers some substantial goal of the State.”).
177
See id. The Plyler Court concluded that undocumented aliens cannot be treated as a
“suspect class” because their class status is a result of “voluntary action,” the entry into
which is a crime itself. Id. at 218–19. On the other hand, a suspect class of individuals is
one on which legislation imposes “special disabilities . . . by virtue of circumstances beyond
their control.” Id. at 217 n.14. As a result, illegal aliens are not a suspect class and are
therefore subject to rational basis review. Id. at 223. As a note, the equal protection analysis
developed in this Comment is based on the implicit analysis utilized by the Plyler Court.
178
Id. at 221.
179
Id. at 202, 221.
180
Id. at 221.
181
Id. at 203.
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class of alien individuals if applied unequally. 182
2. “The People” of the Fourth Amendment
While the Court in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez did not find the
Fourth Amendment applicable to an alien who never lived in the United
States, it recognized the possibility that aliens who are part of a “national
community” or who “have otherwise developed sufficient connection with
this country” may be able to assert such rights. 183 The Court ruled that the
Fourth Amendment did not apply to the search by American authorities of
the Mexican residence of a Mexican citizen and resident who had no
voluntary attachment to the United States. 184
In its analysis of the Fourth Amendment, the Court reasoned that “the
people” protected by the First, Second, and Fourth Amendments, as well as
to whom the rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments, refers to a class of persons who are part of a “national
community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with
this country to be considered part of that community.” 185
Even though the Court did not explicitly define what it meant by
“sufficient connection,” it unambiguously decided that a noncitizen, who
was arrested in a foreign country, transported to the United States, and
present in the United States for several days during which time his house
was searched, had not established a “sufficient” connection. 186 A
noncitizen seeking admission to the United States for the first time would
accordingly make a “futile” attempt if he or she should seek protection
under the Bill of Rights. 187
The claim of an illegal alien is presumably stronger if he or she not
only “enter[s]” the country, but also “reside[s]” here. 188 Although the Court
did not rule “squarely” on whether the Fourth Amendment protects aliens, it
hinted that a noncitizen might have a more legitimate claim if he or she
were in the United States voluntarily and if he or she accepted “some
societal obligations.” 189
Verdugo-Urquidez tempered this seemingly alien-friendly approach
with the caveat that constitutional provisions apply differently to citizens
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189

Id. at 202.
494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990).
Id. at 274–75.
Id. at 265.
Id. at 271.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 273.
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and aliens. 190 Citing Mathews v. Diaz, the Court held that Supreme Court
decisions have accorded “differing protection to aliens than to citizens,
based on [the Court’s] conclusion that the particular provisions in question
were not intended to extend to aliens in the same degree as to citizens.” 191
Therefore, while Verdugo-Urquidez held that the Fourth Amendment
did not apply to an alien with insufficient connections to the United States,
it left the door open to at least some Fourth Amendment protection for those
aliens who are part of a “national community” or who “have developed
sufficient connection with this country,” based on a voluntary presence in
the United States and an acceptance of “some societal obligations.” 192
3. “The People” of the First Amendment
The Supreme Court has previously recognized that aliens have First
Amendment rights. In the 1940s, the Court in Bridges v. Wixon held that
“[f]reedom of speech and press is accorded to aliens residing in this
country.” 193 The Court additionally noted in Bridges v. State of California
that the assurance of First Amendment rights is “everyone’s concern.” 194
The Supreme Court has thereby concluded that the First Amendment is
incorporated into the Due Process Clause because it is “implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty” and therefore protected by the liberty guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment. 195 Because the Due Process Clause has
been held to apply to noncitizens, the Court held that the First Amendment
is applicable to them by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. 196
However, more recent Supreme Court decisions seem to limit illegal
aliens’ First Amendment rights, at a minimum, to resident aliens. 197 For
example, in 1999, the Supreme Court in Reno v. American-Arab AntiDiscrimination Committee rejected illegal aliens’ First Amendment claims
because “[w]hen an alien’s continuing presence in this country is in
violation of the immigration laws, the Government does not offend the
190

Id.
Id. (citing M athews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79–80 (1976)).
192
Id. at 265, 273–75.
193
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945).
194
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 282 (1941).
195
Id. at 281 (citation omitted).
196
See id.; see also M aryam Kamali M iyamoto, The First Amendment After Reno v.
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee: A Different Bill of Rights for Aliens?, 35
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 183, 186 (2000) (arguing that although the Supreme Court has
given deference to Congress’s broad power over immigration matters, in many instances, the
Court has not distinguished between aliens and citizens for the purpose of resolving First
Amendment issues, even in cases where free speech and association were linked with the
deportation of aliens).
197
See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491–92 (1999).
191
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Constitution by deporting him for the additional reason that it believes him
to be a member of an organization that supports terrorist activity.” 198
Some scholars believe that this decision is momentous for aliens’
rights under the First Amendment because “[b]y rejecting a valid
constitutional defense of selective enforcement in this context, [the Court]
implied that aliens who were unlawfully present in the United States did not
enjoy the protection of the First Amendment.” 199
Although the Supreme Court has previously recognized illegal aliens’
right to protection under the First Amendment, its more recent decisions
have thus called the extent of this protection into question.
It is clear from Supreme Court precedent that illegal aliens are indeed
accorded certain rights under the U.S. Constitution. Because they are
considered “persons” in the constitutional sense, the Court has generally
protected illegal aliens under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
However, the Court has also restricted some rights. Although it has
historically accorded illegal aliens protection under the First Amendment,
the Court has recently limited this privilege. Similarly, while it has left the
door open to at least some Fourth Amendment protection, the Court has
never actually ruled on this issue. The Supreme Court has therefore not
been consistent in its accordance of constitutional rights to illegal aliens.
D. PORTILLO-MUNOZ WAS CORRECT IN DENYING ILLEGAL ALIENS
SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHTS

Portillo-Munoz’s ultimate decision to exclude illegal aliens from the
protections of the Second Amendment is correct, although the court was
incorrect in holding that “the people” has different meanings within the Bill
of Rights. Heller has reformulated “the people” from those individuals who
were part of a “national community” to those who are now part of a
“political” one. In contravention of the Portillo-Munoz reasoning, Heller
extended its interpretation of “the people” to other constitutional
amendments,200 which serves to exclude illegal aliens from this group not
only in the Second Amendment, but also across the other Bill of Rights
guarantees.
Even if illegal aliens are part of “the people,” the Second Amendment
may be restricted to U.S. citizens because illegal aliens are not a “suspect
class” under the Equal Protection Clause. 201 Because the right concerned is
only subject to rational basis review, to prevail on an Equal Protection
198
199
200
201

Id.
M iyamoto, supra note 196, at 205.
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580, 635 (2008).
See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 202 (1982).
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challenge, the right must either be fundamental or the restriction on the
right must impose “a lifetime hardship.” 202
While the right to bear arms is considered fundamental after
McDonald v. City of Chicago,203 it is nevertheless unclear whether illegal
aliens are entitled to its protection. Ultimately, this issue is of little
consequence, especially since the Supreme Court has been inconsistent in
according fundamental rights equally to illegal aliens. Illegal aliens may
also be excluded from the Second Amendment based on the long-standing
prohibition on the possession of firearms by illegal aliens under 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(5).
Additionally, the restriction on the right to bear arms does not impose
a “lifetime hardship” on illegal aliens because the individuals who assert
Second Amendment rights are fully consenting adults who voluntarily
broke the law and because their status of illegality is subject to change. As
a result, illegal aliens may be excluded from the Second Amendment.
1. Heller Has Excluded Illegal Aliens from “the People”
of the Bill of Rights
By changing who belongs in “the people” from a “national” to a
“political” group, and then extending this reasoning to other Bill of Rights
amendments with this phrase, Heller has excluded illegal aliens from “the
people.” The reasoning of the Portillo-Munoz majority that “the people” in
the Second and Fourth Amendments refer to different groups of people is
erroneous. 204 In his Portillo-Munoz dissent, Judge Dennis argued that
Supreme Court precedent recognizes that the phrase “the people” has the
same meaning in the First, Second, and Fourth Amendments. 205 Similar
reasoning pervades pre-Heller precedent. The Parker and Emerson courts
also interpreted “the people” to have the same meaning in the First, Second,
Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments. 206 Both courts declined to argue
that “the people” under the Second Amendment is limited to a “subset” of
individuals because of the uniform construction of other Bill of Rights
provisions. 207
The Supreme Court has likewise endorsed a “uniform” reading of the
phrase “the people” in the U.S. Constitution. In Verdugo-Urquidez, the

202

See id. at 216.
See M cDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010).
204
See United States v. Portillo-M unoz, 643 F.3d 437, 440 (5th Cir. 2011).
205
Id. at 443.
206
Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 381 (D.C. Cir. 2007); United States v.
Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 227 (5th Cir. 2001).
207
Parker, 478 F.3d at 381; Emerson, 270 F.3d at 227.
203
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Court, in discussing the Framers’ placement of the words “the people,” held
that “the people protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and
Second Amendments,” refers to one “class” of persons. 208 In Heller, the
Court explained how there are three other instances of “the people” in the
Bill of Rights, including the First, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments, and
concluding that all three provisions “unambiguously refer to individual
rights.” 209 Based on this precedent, “the people” should be interpreted
uniformly throughout the Bill of Rights.
While this interpretation makes it seem that Heller expanded the group
of individuals who may be included in “the people,” it actually limited the
scope of this group from individuals who were part of a “national
community,” used in Verdugo-Urquidez, to “law-abiding, responsible
citizens,” i.e., part of a newly minted “political community.” 210 A
“national” community is theoretically broader than a “political” one
because a “political” community includes only citizens. 211 A “political”
reformulation implies the inclusion only of those who already possess rights
of a “political” nature—e.g., voting, holding public office—while a
“national” formulation of “the people” is more “malleable, potentially
including all who believe in the ideals of, and are connected to, the
nation.” 212
Thus, although Verdugo-Urquidez seems to have left open “the
possibility” that classes of noncitizens, even undocumented immigrants,
could be included in “the people,” the Heller Court silently shifted the focus
on membership in “the people” to a “political” rather than a “national”
lens. 213 The shift is a subtle one because even though the Heller majority
quoted the Verdugo-Urquidez Court’s reference to a “national community,”
it did not acknowledge the fact that it replaced the word “national” with
“political.” 214
Heller extended this new interpretation to other constitutional
amendments under the guise of uniformity, thereby excluding illegal aliens
from membership in “the people.” The Court held that “the term
unambiguously refers to all members of the political community . . . in all
six other provisions of the Constitution.” 215 This extension is consistent
with its emphasis on a uniform reading of “the people” in the Bill of
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215

494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990).
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579 (2008).
Id. at 635; Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265.
Gulasekaram, supra note 145, at 1536.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Heller, 554 U.S. at 580 (emphasis added).
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Rights. 216 It is also consistent with pre-Heller precedent like Emerson,
which concluded that “the people,” as used in the Second Amendment,
“refers to individual Americans.” 217 Heller therefore served to limit the
scope of “the people” in the Bill of Rights.
As a result of the Supreme Court’s recent reformulation of “the
people” and its extension of this interpretation to other constitutional
amendments, Judge Dennis’s argument that Portillo should be included in
the definition of “the people” because he has “sufficient connections” with
the United States is misguided. 218 Before Heller, an illegal alien could
become part of a “national community” by developing a “sufficient
connection” with the United States. 219 Heller, however, changed this
analysis by replacing what used to be a “national” community with a
“political” one. 220 Since the term “political” connotes “core political rights”
that cannot be exercised by noncitizens,221 Heller’s reformulation
theoretically requires courts to include only citizens in their definition of
“the people,” as many lower federal courts like Portillo-Munoz have done
in their Second Amendment jurisprudence. 222
2. Constitutional Rights Are Not Accorded Automatically to Illegal Aliens
The Portillo-Munoz majority was correct in excluding illegal aliens
from the Second Amendment 223 because, even if the phrase “the people”
does not exclude illegal aliens based on Heller’s definition, it is consistent
with U.S. Supreme Court precedent that accords illegal aliens less
protection under the Constitution than U.S. citizens.
The Court concluded in Verdugo-Urquidez that aliens and citizens are
accorded different protection under the U.S. Constitution, based on its
decision in Mathews v. Diaz. 224 In Mathews, the Court held that “[i]n the
exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress
regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.” 225
216

See id. at 579–81; United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990).
United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 229 (5th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added).
218
United States v. Portillo-M unoz, 643 F.3d 437, 445–48 (5th Cir. 2011) (Dennis, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (relying on the Verdugo-Urquidez requirements).
219
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265.
220
Heller, 554 U.S. at 580.
221
Gulasekaram, supra note 145, at 1537.
222
See, e.g., Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 440.
223
Id. at 441.
224
See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 273.
225
426 U.S. 67, 79–80 (1976) (holding that Congress may condition aliens’ eligibility for
participation in a federal medical insurance program on continuous residence in the United
States for a five-year period and admission for permanent residence, without depriving aliens
217
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The Mathews Court explained that while illegal aliens are given minimal
constitutional protection, they are not entitled to the full array of rights
available to U.S. citizens: “The fact that all persons, aliens and citizens
alike, are protected by the Due Process Clause does not lead to the further
conclusion that all aliens must be placed in a single homogenous legal
classification.” 226
As a result of this differing protection, while illegal aliens are
“persons” 227 that are entitled to some due process and equal protection
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment,228 they are not a “suspect class”
under the Equal Protection Clause. 229 This means that illegal aliens who try
to assert constitutional rights are only accorded rational basis review. 230
Under this standard, the Court “seek[s] only the assurance that the
classification at issue bears some fair relationship to a legitimate public
purpose.” 231 Even if illegal aliens were part of “the people,” it is possible
that the Second Amendment would nevertheless be restricted to U.S.
citizens based on deference to “a legitimate public purpose.” 232
In analyzing whether an illegal alien should be entitled to the same
right as a U.S. citizen under an equal protection analysis, the Court requires
that the right concerned be either fundamental or that the governmental
regulation of this right imposes “a lifetime hardship” on the individual. 233
Even when a fundamental right is concerned, the Court has been
inconsistent regarding which rights apply equally to illegal aliens. In the
context of the government’s denial of habeas corpus to alien defendants
who were unlawfully detained and imprisoned, the Court in United States v.
Wong Kim Ark, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, and Wong Wing v. United States held
that the illegal alien was entitled to the same fundamental right to personal
liberty as a citizen. 234
Meanwhile, the Fourth Amendment has not yet been extended to
of due process of the law).
226
Id. at 78.
227
This broadens the rights accorded to aliens under the U.S. Constitution: “‘[T]he term
“person,” used in the Fifth Amendment, is broad enough to include any and every human
being within the jurisdiction of the republic.’” Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 212 n.11 (1982)
(quoting United States v. Wong Wing, 163 U.S. 228, 242–43 (1896) (Field, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part)).
228
Id. at 202.
229
Id.
230
Id.
231
Id. at 216.
232
See id.
233
Id.
234
See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 649 (1898); United States v.
Wong Wing, 163 U.S. 228, 229 (1896); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 356 (1886).
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illegal aliens. While illegal aliens could potentially be afforded Fourth
Amendment protection if they have “sufficient connections” to the United
States, the Verdugo-Urquidez Court declined to confront this issue
“squarely.” 235 The fact that the Court assumed that the Fourth Amendment
could potentially protect illegal aliens “for the sake of argument,” as Judge
Dennis explains, does not mean that illegal aliens are necessarily afforded
Fourth Amendment rights. 236 It is uncertain how the Supreme Court would
rule on this issue.
Similarly, although the Supreme Court recognized in Bridges that
aliens have rights under the First Amendment, more recent Supreme Court
decisions like Reno seem to limit this right, at a minimum, to resident
aliens. 237
As the above analysis demonstrates, even if illegal aliens are
considered “persons” under the Fourteenth Amendment, as part of “the
people” in the First Amendment, and potentially as part of “the people” in
the Fourth Amendment, they are not consistently protected under these
provisions. This shows that constitutional rights are not accorded to illegal
aliens on an automatic basis. 238
The arguments of Judge Dennis, Professor Winkler, and other critics
are therefore inconsistent with U.S. Supreme Court precedent. 239 Judge
Dennis, for example, argues that the Portillo-Munoz majority decision
signifies that millions of persons in the United States may be subject to
unjustified searches and cannot “peaceably assemble or petition the
government.” 240 Professor Winkler also asks whether the Portillo-Munoz
decision signifies that police can “invade [illegal aliens’] homes without
probable cause” or “stop them from peaceably assembling.” 241
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United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 272 (1990).
See United States v. Portillo-M unoz, 643 F.3d 437, 446 (5th Cir. 2011) (Dennis, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 273).
237
See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252,
282 (1941). But see Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491–92
(1999) (rejecting illegal aliens’ First Amendment claims).
238
See, e.g., Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. at 491–92; see also
M ichael Scaperlanda, Partial Membership: Aliens and the Constitutional Community, 81
IOWA L. REV. 707, 718–19 (1996) (“Like the noncitizen, the Court finds itself straddling two
worlds, the one rooted in individual rights . . . and the other deeply concerned with
communal formation. . . . [The Court] ignores the possible constitutional rights of the
noncitizen, subordinating any such interests to Congress’s plenary power to expel those not
possessing membership in the national community.”).
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Johnson & Edmondson, supra note 94.
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Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 443 (Dennis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
241
Johnson & Edmondson, supra note 94.
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Although these arguments are fair and even arguably necessary, they
are unfortunately not consistent with Supreme Court rulings. The Court has
never ruled that illegal aliens have Fourth Amendment rights and has
significantly abridged their First Amendment rights. The Portillo-Munoz
majority cannot call into question constitutional rights that were never
held—or were only tenuously held—by illegal aliens.
3. Although the Second Amendment Is a Fundamental Right, It Is
Not Clear Whether It Applies to Illegal Aliens
Even though the Supreme Court has held that the Second Amendment
is fundamental, this does not necessarily guarantee protection to illegal
aliens. McDonald v. City of Chicago incorporated the right to keep and
bear arms into the concept of due process. 242 According to the plurality of
the Court, self-defense is “fundamental” to our “scheme of ordered
liberty.” 243
Once a right is deemed fundamental, like the Second Amendment
here, a “distinction based on citizenship status would appear to be
irrational.” 244 This is because the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause protects “person[s],” which is “presumably the broadest
formulation” of those who are accorded constitutional rights. 245 This broad
formulation is based on cases like United States v. Wong Kim Ark, Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, and United States v. Wong Wing, which have held that illegal
aliens are “persons” under the Fourteenth Amendment. 246 Because the
Second Amendment is fundamental, it should theoretically be incorporated
into the Due Process Clause, thereby including both citizens and
noncitizens. 247
However, it does not seem that McDonald has had any real impact on
lower federal courts confronting the issue of illegal aliens and the Second
Amendment. These courts have virtually ignored McDonald. 248 For
example, after its discussion of Heller’s reformulation of the phrase “the
people,” the Portillo-Munoz majority added that “nothing in McDonald v.
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See M cDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3042 (2010).
Id. at 3036.
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Gulasekaram, supra note 145, at 1540.
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See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 649 (1898); United States v.
Wong Wing, 163 U.S. 228, 229 (1896); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 356 (1886).
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See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (citing Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 242–43)
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City of Chicago . . . suggests otherwise.” 249 Interestingly, Judge Dennis did
not even mention McDonald in his Portillo-Munoz dissent. 250
Part of this may be due to the fact that, as some scholars have argued,
“unlike Heller, which declared Washington D.C.’s gun ban
unconstitutional, McDonald merely remand[ed] Chicago’s gun law to the
lower courts” and “despite that remand, the plurality again declined to
articulate the precise standard of review [for Second Amendment cases] that
the lower courts should use.” 251
Whatever the reasons, the fact that McDonald has not played a role in
these decisions is significant, especially since rendering the Second
Amendment fundamental should theoretically expand it to both citizens and
noncitizens alike. This significance is underscored by the fact that “the
effects of Supreme Court decisions are highly dependent upon treatment by
lower courts.” 252 Courts confronting this issue have not considered the
fundamentality of the Second Amendment as dispositive of illegal alien
protection. McDonald has therefore not prevented lower courts from
denying Second Amendment protection to illegal aliens.
Additionally, although Heller and McDonald did not mention whether
or not illegal aliens have the right to bear arms, the Heller majority noted
that the Second Amendment is not “absolute”—in other words, that some
statutes and ordinances regulating gun use are still constitutional. 253 The
McDonald Court echoed these restrictions, despite its holding that the
Second Amendment is fundamental, by holding that the right to bear arms
is not absolute. 254 In explicitly citing Heller’s “safe harbor” provision,
Justice Alito said, “We repeat those assurances here. Despite municipal
respondents’ doomsday proclamations, incorporation does not imperil every
law regulating firearms.” 255 These regulations could potentially include the
prohibition on illegal alien gun ownership under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5). 256
In fact, that is exactly how lower federal courts have treated the
issue. 257 Heller emphasized that, despite mentioning specific restrictions on
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the possession of firearms by such groups as felons and the mentally ill,258
the Court did “not undertake an exhuastive historical analysis . . . of the full
scope of the Second Amendment.” 259 This means that other prohibitions in
effect before Heller, not mentioned explicitly by the Court, are left
undisturbed after its ruling. 260 Because 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is the same
statute that also criminalizes gun possession by felons and the mentally
ill,261 the lower federal courts were likely correct in holding that the same
statute applies to the long-standing prohibitions on possession of firearms
by illegal aliens. 262
Although the Second Amendment is fundamental, this fact has not
helped illegal aliens asserting their Second Amendment rights in federal
courts. According to both Heller and McDonald, illegal aliens may be
excluded from the Amendment’s purview based on the long-standing
prohibition on the possession of firearms by illegal aliens under 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(5). As the above discussion on the Bill of Rights guarantees
indicates, illegal aliens may also be excluded from the Second Amendment
simply on the basis that the constitutional amendments are not
automatically applied equally to illegal aliens. Just because the Second
Amendment is fundamental, therefore, does not mean that illegal aliens are
necessarily entitled to its protection.
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Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27.
Id. at 626.
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Section 922(g) provides, in relevant part, that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person”
who “has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year” (§ 922(g)(1)), or “who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or
who has been committed to a mental institution” to possess a firearm (§ 922(g)(4)). 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), (g)(4).
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See United States v. Yanez-Vasquez, No. 09-40056-01-SAC, 2010 WL 411112, at *2
(D. Kan. Jan. 28, 2010); United States v. Guerrero-Leco, No. 3:08cr118, 2008 WL 4534226,
at *1 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 6, 2008); United States v. Solis-Gonzalez, No. 3:08-CR-145-M RDCK-1, 2008 WL 4539663, at *1, *3 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 26, 2008) (“[D]ecisions by this Court
as well as other district courts across the country consistently hold that Heller does not
undermine the constitutionality of prohibitions under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).”).
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4. Restricting the Second Amendment Does Not Impose a “Lifetime
Hardship” on Illegal Aliens
If the Second Amendment right to bear arms does not otherwise apply
to illegal aliens, Plyler suggests that restrictions on aliens’ right to bear
arms are unconstitutional only if they impose “a lifetime hardship” on the
class of illegal aliens. 263 Even though education was not considered
fundamental in Plyler, the statute restricting public education to U.S.
citizens nevertheless imposed a “lifetime hardship” on the illegal alien
children because it posed a lifelong “obstacle on individual
achievement.” 264
First, the restriction on the right to bear arms—namely, 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(5)—is not of the same character as an “obstacle” to the lifelong
individual achievement of illegal aliens.
Unlike the deprivation of
education, which the Court in Plyler said “takes an estimable toll on the
social, economic, intellectual, and psychological well-being of the
individual, and poses an obstacle to individual achievement,” 265 the
deprivation of gun possession is entirely different.
Gun ownership does not have the detrimental “intellectual” and
“psychological” effects on one’s “individual achievement” that the
deprivation of education does. The right to bear arms instead involves the
“inherent right of self-defense.” 266 Rather than a civil right, the right to
bear arms has historically been considered a political right. 267 This is
demonstrated by Professor Akhil Amar, who maintains that “the right to
bear arms ha[s] long been viewed as a political right, a right of First-Class
Citizens,” and one closely connected with the right to vote. 268 Heller, of
course, reaffirmed this view of the Second Amendment by restricting its
application to a “political community” of citizens who are “law-abiding.” 269
263
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Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Aliens with Guns: Equal Protection, Federal Power, and
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A restriction on the right to bear arms is therefore not an “obstacle” to
individual achievement as education has been held to be; rather, it is a
political privilege historically accorded to U.S. citizens.
Second, restrictions on the right to bear arms do not have a lifelong
effect on illegal aliens attempting to assert Second Amendment rights. The
Plyler Court noted that the denial of educational opportunities to illegal
alien children would have lifelong effects on them because, as it explained,
“[t]he stigma of illiteracy will mark them for the rest of their lives.” 270 The
Court further stated that “[b]y denying these children a basic education, we
deny them the ability to live within the structure of our civil institutions,
and foreclose any realistic possibility that they will contribute in even the
smallest way to the progress of our Nation.” 271
Not being able to assert the right of self-defense does not pose lifelong
effects because the status of the illegal alien is subject to change, due to
either his acquisition of citizenship or residency status in the United States,
or his voluntary or involuntary departure from the United States. In either
of those scenarios, the individual could attain the right to possess a gun,
while a child who is denied an educational opportunity would be
disadvantaged for the rest of his or her life (as the Court said, “illiteracy is
an enduring disability”). 272
Third, illegal aliens asserting their Second Amendment rights are
unlike the school-age children asserting their educational rights in Plyler
because they are fully consenting adults. 273 This is significant because
Plyler underscored the involuntary nature of the children’s illegal status. 274
While determining the rationality of the Texas law, the Court noted that it
“may appropriately take into account its costs to the Nation and to the
innocent children who are its victims.” 275 The Court further provided that
“the Texas statute imposes a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children
not accountable for their disabling status. These children can neither affect
their parents’ conduct nor their own undocumented status.” 276
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The individuals who have access to firearms, by contrast, are fully
consenting adults who voluntarily broke the law by illegally crossing the
border of the United States. Even if there is a lifelong obstacle in not being
able to possess a firearm, this obstacle is a self-imposed one and therefore
distinct from children whose parents made the decision to cross the U.S.
border illegally.
Plyler’s analysis signifies that it would be difficult for an illegal alien
to claim that a denial of his or her Second Amendment right is a lifelong
obstacle because he or she voluntarily broke the law by illegally entering
the United States in the first place. 277 On the other hand, despite this right
being fundamental, illegal aliens may nevertheless be excluded from its
purview based on the long-standing prohibition on the possession of
firearms by illegal aliens under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5). Ultimately,
however, it does not much matter whether or not the right to bear arms is a
fundamental one because even if it is fundamental, constitutional rights are
not accorded automatically to illegal aliens. As a result, illegal aliens could
and should be excluded from the Second Amendment.
IV. CONCLUSION
Many questions still remain after the Supreme Court’s ruling in
District of Columbia v. Heller, including who are “the people” protected by
the Second Amendment. The first federal court of appeals case on the
issue, United States v. Portillo-Munoz, held that illegal aliens do not have
such a right.
This Comment has argued that illegal aliens are not members of “the
people” of the Second Amendment and that they lack the constitutional
right to bear arms. Heller has limited “the people” from those individuals
who are part of a “national” community to those who are now part of a
“political” one. This constraint signifies that the right to bear arms is
limited only to “law-abiding” American citizens. Even if illegal aliens are
part of “the people,” the government may restrict their Second Amendment
right on the ground that illegal aliens are not a suspect class under the Equal
Protection Clause. Accordingly, Portillo-Munoz’s ultimate decision is
consistent with Supreme Court precedent in according illegal aliens
differing protection under the U.S. Constitution than U.S. citizens,
particularly under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
While it would be ideal for the U.S. Constitution to protect everyone
within the United States’ jurisdiction, even individuals who are here
illegally, this protection has historically been inconsistent and only
accorded on a case-by-case basis. The reasoning behind this inconsistency
277
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seems to be premised on the fact that illegal aliens have broken U.S. law by
illegally crossing the border. Portillo-Munoz, therefore, cannot be criticized
as having dire consequences for the constitutional rights of illegal aliens
because the existence and extent of these rights was uncertain long before
the decision. It is possible that the Supreme Court may strengthen such
rights in the future but until then, one court of appeals surely cannot be
expected to change U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence overnight.

